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Narrative, Photographs and the Experience of Memory
Dr Margaret Hills de Zárate
Abstract: Themes relating to time, space, absence and loss are explored
through narrative and image with particular reference to D.W. Winnicott’s
concept of intermediate space and Roland Barthes’ writings on photography.
Keywords: narrative inquiry, space, absence, memory, punctum
Introduction
I am moved by fancies that are curled
Around these images, and cling:
The notion of some infinitely gentle
Infinitely suffering thing.
(T.S.Eliot (1920) Preludes).
This paper proposes a series of connections between space, time, presence
and absence and loss as expressed through art. While all of these themes
form part of an aesthetic vocabulary common to all the arts as expressed in a
multitude of forms, which we recognize and which resonate with us  as
evocations of our lived, remembered or perhaps longed for experience, the
emphasis in this paper is on photography; as a testament to time past.
In performance art, drama and dance, physical spatiality is used to express
human emotion and relationship and to intimate how we want to be with
others and how we are with ourselves (Jennings, 1994). In architecture and in
the physicality of our social arrangements it is intimately connected to power;
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invoking awe or suggesting intimacy (Foucault, 1965; Markus, 1993).
Negative and positive space are amongst the basic elements of composition
in painting; positive space is the space occupied by the subject while negative
space is the space that is not the subject but which, importantly, defines the
subject.
In its relationship to time, space assumes an existential quality. The music
therapist James Robertson (2008) draws our attention to this when he refers
to the sensitive balance between sound and silence in music suggesting that
it is often an enlightening process to note, in listening to recordings of
improvisations, that what we considered to be a prolonged silence in the
moment of interaction was perhaps no longer than a few seconds; silence
creates a space which makes sound significant (Robertson, 2008).
We recognize and relate to these representations in the arts because they are
experienced within a space which Donald Winnicott (1971) referred to as the
third area, the area of illusion or transitional space; a condensation of his
ideas of potential space and transitional phenomena. Positioned between
inner subjective reality and the objective outside world, this transitional space
opens up in infancy, when the child first comes to realize that his mother is not
merely an extension of himself and that the absent mother will return. It is a
space inhabited by transitional phenomena, the first ‘me’ and ‘not-me’ object,
which facilitates the transition from the omnipotence of the tiny baby for whom
external objects have not yet separated out, to the capacity to relate to
‘objectively perceived’ objects (Winnicott, 1971).
This ‘object’ might be a rag, a small blanket, favourite doll or teddy bear but it
may be a song, the edge of a curtain, the mother herself, an image in the
mind. Its fate is to be gradually cathected, invested with emotional or mental
energy and then in the course of the ensuing years to become not so much
forgotten as relegated to limbo (Young, 1994). In health the transitional object
does not ‘go inside’ nor does the feeling about it necessarily undergo
repression. It is not forgotten and it is not mourned. It loses meaning, and this
is because the transitional phenomena have become diffused, have become
spread out over the whole intermediate territory between ‘inner psychic reality’
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and ‘the external world as perceived by two persons in common’, that is to
say, over the whole cultural field (Winnicott, 1975).
This overlapping space, neither subject nor object but some of both, describes
the intermediate area of human experience between inner reality and the
outside world. But in its sense of not ‘either/or’ but ‘both/and’, it occurs to me
that it is also a concept reminiscent of  Hudson’s (1977) notion of the
composite nature of rationality in which it is suggested that the rational
enterprise is a dialectical process; two things, and not one, in tension. The
space between shares this composite quality in that it bridges and allows us
to tolerate the tension between external and internal realities. Winnicott (1971)
suggests that, while we are never free of this tension, relief may be found in
this area of intermediate experience which is directly related and in continuity
with the child who is ‘lost’ in play and maintained throughout the life cycle in
the intense experiences which belong to the imaginative life, to the arts and to
religion and to creative scientific work (Winnicott, 1971, p. 15).
It departs from theories which attribute to the individual a rich inner world at
the expense of an acknowledgement of the outer world and challenges
traditional epistemologies where one is taught to think of a line between
subject and object (Martín Baró, 1996). Rather it proposes a territory with a
permeable boundary where a constant traffic moves in both directions; as in
dialectical thinking which involves the combining of opposing or contradictory
ideas (thesis and antithesis) to create new ideas (synthesis).
It is here in this intermediate territory that we experience the art object as
more than the sum of its parts, where the dance and the dancer are one and
the same, and where the expressive arts may have the potential to facilitate
and enable both creative growth and understanding of self and other.  No one
expresses this better than Yeats who amongst schoolchildren reflected upon
the passing of time, our relationship to it, and presents a vision of beauty
based on totality.
‘O Chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom, or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?’
(Yeats, Amongst Schoolchildren, 1928)
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As Conway (1992) observes, for Yeats, no part of the human experience can
be privileged over another. Aesthetics do not depend upon separation or
distance. The whole is always more than the sum of its parts. An aesthetic
ideal for art and for everyday life rises out of totality: the ability to see things in
relation to one another, not as separate or self-sufficient (Conway, 1992). Art
is always about something even if it is absent. As Adorno notes, ‘As long as
the perception of art is confined to art, the work of art is not adequately
perceived, the inner composition of a work calls for an external referent which
is not part of art, yet mediated by it’ (Adorno, 1984, p. 478).
Absence and Presence
I am interested in absence; absence as an external referent and how it is
mediated through the image and explored through the narratives that refer to
the image. In choosing a photograph of an art object and personal photograph
as exemplars I explore by implication the distance between myself and the
original object.
The visual spaces, with which I am concerned evoke absence and,
paradoxically, suggest the presence of absence.  Sorkin (2008) acknowledges
this paradox when she responds to the artist Zoe Leonard’s statement about
her work Strange Fruit (1993-8) to which I refer throughout this paper. When
Leonard says, ‘The fruit is very, very silent’, I believe she means that it both
comes from a place of absence and also creates one (Sorkin, 2008). It is, as
the curator Matthew Shaul (2009) puts it, an example of when an implied
absence works to confirm a suggested presence.
Zoe Leonard’s work touches on the inter-related themes of space and time
and the representation of absence. Begun in 1993, Strange Fruit is a
continual series of installations composed of over 300 fruit skins that have
been stitched and ornamented with colourful wires, thread, zippers, and
buttons (Hochfield, 2002).
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Strange Fruit, Zoe Leonard (1993-8)
Photograph: Arnd Wedemeyer, 28th September 2003.
Leonard describes its evolution as a work of mourning after the death of a
friend ... as ‘a way to sew myself back up’ (Leonard, 1998). Her account of the
process of this mourning work  recalls Winnicott’s description of the child ‘lost
in play’; that satisfactory human activity which, whether it is called work or
play, aims, consciously or unconsciously, at the achievement of harmony
between the individual and his environment (Winnicott, 1945).
‘I didn't even realize I was making art when I started doing them. I had just
come back from India and was impressed with how each scrap of paper, each
bit of wire was used to its maximum, to the very end of its possible useful life.
. . . One morning I'd eaten these two oranges, and I just didn't want to throw
the peels away, so absentmindedly I sewed them back up’ (Leonard cited in
Temkin, 1998).
Temkin (1998) suggests that Leonard's claim that she didn't realize she was
making art when she began stitching the fruit typifies the rhetoric of 20th-
century art which has sought to erase boundaries between art and life.
Eventually the work seemed to Leonard to be art, and she continued working
on it in New York and, later, during two years, in a remote part of Alaska,
where she mainly relied on fruit being mailed to her. The work was exhibited
for the first time in 1995 in her apartment and later in 1997 at the Museum of
Contemporary Art in Miami and at the Kunsthalle in Basel.
Of the activity of making the work Leonard has stated:
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‘This act of fixing something broken, repairing the skin of something after the
fruit of it is gone, strikes me as both pathetic and beautiful. At any rate it is
intensely human’ (Leonard, 1998).
In 1998 the work was acquired by the Philadelphia Museum of Art. Leonard,
who had previously rejected proposals to conserve the work, developed
concerns about it having a specific space devoted to it; being shown
continuously and showing it as it disintegrated. An agreement was eventually
reached whereby the piece would be exhibited for limited periods of time
which seemed in the spirit of the work's sense of marking time.
As Massey (1999) demonstrates, space, difference and interconnections
between differences are necessary for time to exist. Time does not somehow
‘bootstrap itself into existence’ Massey (1999). The result is that there can
never be separate spatial or temporal imaginaries; there can only be space-
time imaginaries. The movements we make in space produce time (Pugh,
2007).
Strange Fruit began as a means of consolation for the artist after the death of
a friend, but now presents a wide range of possible readings. As a meditation
on loss and mortality, it elicits associations to the traditional Dutch still-life
paintings known as ‘Vanitas’ which show objects that suggest the passing of
time, such as a flickering candle or a wilting flower, and invite the viewer to
contemplate the brevity of life and the vanity of worldly possessions. Unlike a
painting, however, Leonard's Strange Fruit is itself intended to be transitory,
and will deteriorate and eventually disappear over time. This process will be
documented through photography, which as Barthes (1980) has explained
creates an illusion of ‘what is’, when ‘what was’ or ‘what has ceased to be’,
would be a more accurate description.
What the photographer captures as she depresses the shutter is a moment
already gone by the time she releases it.  Instead of making reality solid, we
are reminded that it is transient. The photograph is a witness, but a witness of
something that is no more (Barthes, 1979). As such it is according to Sontag
(1977) ‘not only an image (as a painting is an image), an interpretation of the
real; it is also a trace, something directly stencilled off the real, like a footprint
or a death mask’ (Sontag, 1977, p.154).
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 Early in the same year Barthes, in a radio interview, expressed a not
dissimilar thought.
‘In the final analysis, what I really find fascinating about photographs, and they
do fascinate me, is something that probably has to do with death. Perhaps it’s
an interest that is tinged with necrophilia, to be honest, a fascination with what
has died but is represented as wanting to be alive’ (Barthes, 1977, in Calvert
1995, p.220).
But is there not also a trace in the photograph of the eye of the first beholder,
the photographer, since what he does is dependent upon what he (the first
beholder) perceives as he confronts what he does (Gombrich, 1977).
Memory and Forgetting
In thinking about memory and forgetting I begin with the memory of a
photograph.
Nothing was posed and nothing was planned. It was taken twenty years ago
by someone I loved, of someone I love and as such is a trace of a moment
long past. The Operator (the photographer who perceived the optical image)
is dead and the Spectrum (his target, the referent) is no longer a child. In the
role of Spectator I (the viewer) occupy the Operator’s position; he has framed
my viewing space. My eye is pressed up against his lens and time is
collapsed. Located where he once was, in relation to the referent, I cannot say
that I am seeing what he saw... (if so much of what we see is determined by
what we know) ... however much I want …or  try to.
A boy looks out from the photograph. He is squinting slightly in the sunlight.
There are two small indentations on his brow. He is looking at the Operator
who was there and is no longer there. (What did they see in each other’s
eyes?) It is ordinary, the sort of photograph we all have in our albums. Its
appeal, therefore, can only be to someone personally involved with its subject,
someone for whom it reveals the ‘that-which has-been’ ('ce qui a ete').
Alternatively called the noeme or eidos this ‘thing’, which is for Barthes (1980)
the essence of photography, is essentially what differentiates photographs
from other images. The boy is the necessarily real thing ‘that has-been’
placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph.
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Barthes reiterates this throughout Camera Lucida.
In photography I can never deny that the thing has been there’.  And again,
‘The photograph is literally an emanation of the referent’. In this sense, ‘every
photograph is a certificate of presence’ (Barthes, 1981).
But ‘presence,’ in this instance, goes hand in hand with death. ‘What the
photograph reproduces to infinity has occurred only once: the photograph
mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially’ (Barthes,
1981, p.31). As soon as the click of the shutter has occurred, what is
photographed no longer exists; the subject is transformed into object. When
we look at a photograph of ourselves or of others, we are really looking at the
return of the Dead (Perloff, 1997, p.32).
‘All photographs are memento mori. To take a photograph is to participate in
another person's (or thing's) mortality, vulnerability, mutability. Precisely by
slicing out this moment and freezing it, all photographs testify to time's
relentless melt’ (Sontag, 1977, p.15.)
Barthes’ mother had died in October 1977 and Camera Lucida is bound up
with his grief over her death as is revealed by the recent publication of
Mourning Diary (2009), (a series of 330 assembled notes, originally written on
index card-sized slips of paper) begun the day after his mother’s death.
In Camera Lucida he reflects on what has come to be known as the Winter
Garden photograph.
‘In front of the photograph of my mother as a child, I tell myself: she is going
to die: I shudder, like Winnicott's psychotic patient, over a catastrophe which
has already occurred. Whether or not the subject is already dead, every
photograph is this catastrophe. This punctum, more or less blurred beneath
the abundance and the disparity of contemporary photographs, is vividly
legible in historical photographs: there is always a defeat of Time in them: that
which is dead and that which is going to die’ (Barthes, 1979.p.96).
What is this punctum that Barthes  refers to?
In Camera Lucida, Barthes (1980) explains two sets of meaning in a
photograph; the studium and the punctum. He  describes  his interest in the
studium, whether received as political testimony or enjoyed as good historical
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scenes, as matter of grasping the photographer’s intention, of entering into
harmony with him, of approving or disapproving of him but also to trying to
understand him.
‘The studium is that very wide field of unconcerned desire, of various interest,
of inconsequential taste: I like / I don't like. The studium is of the order of
liking, not of loving; it mobilizes a half desire, a demi-volition; it is the same
sort of vague, slippery, irresponsible interest one takes in the people, the
entertainments, the books, the clothes one finds ‘all right.’ To recognize the
studium is inevitably to encounter the photographer's intentions, to enter into
harmony with [them]’ (Barthes, 1979, pp.26-7).
Thus the studium is a kind of education trying to bring forward the point of
view, the idea and the context of the photograph(er); basically an intellectual
discipline whose outcome springs from the capacity for understanding held by
the spectator (Skjaerven, 2008).
This second element, the ‘punctum, breaks (or punctuates) the studium.
This time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my
sovereign consciousness) It is this element (the punctum) which rises from
the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me (Barthes, 1979, 24-
26)
As Armatage (2003) notes Barthes wrote of the punctum as a point of
identification (memory, nostalgia) in connection to a detail of the photograph
that situates the emotional connection in relation to time and affect. His choice
of terminology was metaphorical in relation to the photograph, for the moment
he describes strikes to the heart or point of the recollection that the
photograph insinuates (Armatage, 2003).
‘A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark made by a
pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in that it also refers to the
notion of punctuation, and because the photographs I am speaking of are in
effect punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points;
precisely, these marks, these wounds are so many points. This second
element which will disturb the studium I shall therefore call punctum; for
punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole - and also a cast of the dice. A
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photograph's punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also bruises me,
is poignant to me)’ (Barthes, 1979, pp.26-27).
In thinking about the punctum I return to the memory of the absent
photograph of the frowning boy and to another earlier photograph of the same
boy as a tiny new born baby; also frowning; neither of which are represented
here.
What is here is the boy with a bicycle; older and not frowning (Figure: 2).
Figure 2: Boy and Bicycle
This later photograph refers to those earlier photographs but also (as my eye
traces the line of the cheek) to a photograph which I once saw of a man who I
never met, who died a long time ago in another country. From my intense
looking a narrative emerges. Here, drawing on my own history with this
photograph in particular, and with viewing in general, I, the viewer combine
personal contemplation with themes that broadly encompass universal
concerns amongst which is loss.  Here, memory infuses the landscape of the
photograph, intricately combining the personal and the universal (Housen,
2007).
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The detail which points to the recollection that this photo insinuates is perhaps
(I am not sure) the line of his tilted cheek. It refers to the photograph of the
boy squinting slightly in the sunlight with the two small indentations on his
brow and that in turn points to the earlier image of a frowning baby. Neither of
these details are present here in this photograph.. Here the boy‘s eyes are
averted and the light has smoothed his brow and here I am in error. If I follow
Barthes phenomenological method I must stay with ‘the thing in itself’ ...this
photograph... and bracket (epoché) all other references.1 Looking again I find
a grubby print on the window frame but it does not move me (I merely imagine
it as related to fixing the bicycle). The punctum has to be there (a visible
detail) and I am moved by ‘what is not there’; the presence of ‘not thereness’.
I return to the text and the texts about the text to discover that the punctum,
although originally introduced as a ‘detail’ is recast as ‘time’ in the second
section of Camera Lucida (Furuhata, 2006). For me the punctum is the
passing of time as represented by his smooth brow.  For you (the viewer),
according to Barthes, it can be only one of the thousand manifestations of the
‘ordinary’ (Barthes, 1981, p.73).
Punctuation and Parenthesis
The punctum also has an etymological link to punctuation which inevitably ties
photography to language itself, to the domain of words and writing (Barthes,
1982, p.49). As Taminiaux (2009) notes punctuation implies the possibility of
a break between sentences, of a pause that enables language to find its own
rhythm. It suggests the integration of silence within the text, an end,
conclusion or a suspension of the flow of words (Taminiaux, 2009, p. 110).
However, unlike the punctum which is unintentional, punctuation is intentional;
these commas, semi-colons and full stops did not creep into my text; I placed
them there.
Nevertheless, although intentional it was perhaps not entirely conscious for as
Tang (2008) points out, to recollect or to remember, is an act of punctuating
experience in the past and it is the past with which much of this text is
                                                 
1  Barthes describes his approach to photography in Camera Lucida as “a vague,
casual, even cynical phenomenology,” (Barthes, R. 1980, p.20) In Camera Lucida:
Reflections on Photography (1980), trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang,
1981)
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concerned.  Memory, she argues, can be seen as the recollection of
punctuated experiences.
‘To remember, or to recollect a certain instance of the past is to point to a
certain moment, to emphasize, accentuate, to interrupt with time, and to put a
“period” to a particular moment in the past’ (Tang, 2008, p.13).
These thoughts lead me to consider Barthes’ (1975) ‘theory’ of so-called
‘fragmentality’, where he  suggests that one can achieve jouissance
(enjoyment) or play not directly by the content or the structure but only by the
abrasions, fragments and gaps in the text. This corresponds to a distinction
between texte lisible and texte scriptible, translated respectively as ‘readerly’
and ‘writerly’ texts. The plaisir (pleasure) of the text corresponds to the
readerly text, which does not challenge the reader's position as a subject, that
is, as a being that has subjective experiences, subjective consciousness or a
relationship with another entity (or ‘object’). The ‘writerly’ text however,
provides jouissance (enjoyment); explodes literary codes and allows the
reader to break out of his or her subject position.
The reader of a ‘readerly’ text is largely passive, but the person who engages
with a ‘writerly’ text has to make an active effort. Hawkes (1977) sums this up
as literature which may be divided into that which gives the reader a role, a
function, a contribution to make, and that which renders the reader idle or
redundant, ‘left with no more than the poor freedom either to accept or reject
the text’ and which thereby reduces him to that apt but impotent symbol of the
bourgeois world, an inert consumer to the author’s role as producer (Hawkes,
1977, p.114).Whereas ‘readerly texts’ can only be read in the sense of being
‘submitted to’, ‘writerly texts’ invite us self-consciously to read, to ‘join in’ and
be aware of the interrelationship of the writing and reading, which offers us
the joys of co-operation and co-authorship.
It seems to me that the abrasions, fragments and gaps which invite
jouissance (enjoyment) or play in a text are also there in the photograph. The
interrelationship of ‘writerly’ writing and the ‘joining in’ of reading which
Barthes (1975) describes may be helpful in thinking about the interrelationship
of image and narrative. In proposing this I take Barthes (1977) proposition that
the narratives of the world are without number and include the fixed or moving
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image and Gadamer’s (1975) assertion that interpretation is much more than
the discovery of the artist’s original intent; understanding is never exclusively
concentrated on the artist, but rather concerns a ‘fusion’ of the artist’s horizon
of experience and that of the spectator (Barthes, 1977, p.79; Von
Braebussche, 2006, p. 50).
In one sense the image (and most obviously the photograph) once completed
has occurred in the past, albeit the immediate past, but it may also reveal
‘many possible pasts’ (Holland, 1991). On each and every occasion it is
viewed, including its first viewing by its creator, the past itself will be
reconstructed and thus there are many pasts contained within it as ‘a
consequence of the shifting position of the self’ (Harrison, 2002).
For the viewer, ‘new understandings can arise in the interrogation (not
necessarily in an active way) of any image’; including those images the viewer
has created (Harrison, 2002).
‘As with memory, photographs, function to anchor ourselves with the past, but
they are essentially, as Krauceur (1993) has described it, accumulations of
‘scraps’. The photograph is a reference to past associations, and they go
beyond what is in that representation. It is under or beyond the photograph
that the person’s story lies buried’. (Harrison, 2002, p. 104)
However, such ‘scraps’ or fragments allow for a construction or reconstruction
of narratives; a piecing together or re-ordering of these ‘momentary
appearances’ (Harrison, 2002). But the ‘the very ambiguity and malleability of
photographs, their resistance to definitive explanations, allows us to devise
alternative narratives’ for as Blaikie (2010) puts it, photography allows an
image to be endlessly reproduced and distributed so that almost from the
moment of its being taken a picture can be separated from its origin and
reproduced in any number of contexts (Blaikie, 2010, p.191).
This isolation or’ lifting out of the photograph from social relations and local
contexts of interaction and their recombination across indefinite and infinite
tracts of time-space has been referred to as an example of the disembedding
or dislocating processes of late modernity (Berger and Mohr (1982); Giddens
(1990); Arvanitakis (2010). Berger (1992) argues that the photograph can be
‘rescued’ from this isolation by narrative, referring to ‘a way of seeing which
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requires a reassembling of the contexts of experience in which the
photograph is embedded, the continuity from which it was taken’; (Berger and
Mohr, 1982, p. 107). For Berger (1992) this context is constructed by narrative
(together with other photographs) for as Harrison notes ‘what is absent must
be conjured up’ (Harrison, 2002, p.104).
Looking at the Zoe Leonard’s orange and the boy and wondering about their
juxtaposition in this text I conjure up the absent; although it feels as if it has
simply (and without effort) come to me.
The photographer of the remembered image of the boy squinting in the
sunlight was a painter. He never saw the older boy with the bicycle as he was
already absent by then. This same painter painted a woman planting a little
orange tree. I saw the painting propped up against a wall on top of a piano.
Then years, perhaps three years, after he died I visited his grave; there was
(and still is) an orange tree there, sculpted in relief, on his headstone.
These memories lie under and beyond these photographs. They are my
memories but I am not the photographer.
In conclusion, I return to Gadamer’s assertion that interpretation is more than
the discovery or reconstruction of the artist’s original intent; understanding is
never exclusively concentrated on the artist, but rather concerns a ‘fusion’ of
the artist’s horizon of experience and that of the spectator; the artist’s original
intuition or interpretation being only the beginning of a long chain (Gadamer,
1975, p.273). Not either/or but both/and; past and present, present and
absent.
 The cat subsiding down a basement
Leaves a catlessness behind it.
(Muriel Spark (1951) from the poem ‘Elementary’)
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